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COMMENTS
PROBABLE CAUSE IN A WORLD OF PURE
IMAGINATION: WHY THE CANDYMAN
WARRANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
GOLDEN TICKETS TO SEARCH
FRANCIS A. CAVANAGHt
Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers
of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings
either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to
lie for the public good.1
INTRODUCTION

Throughout our nation's history, courts have struggled to
balance the individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures against law enforcement's need to protect
the community. All Americans have a fundamental right to be
free from "rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and
from unfounded charges of crime," 2 yet law enforcement officials
have legitimate and practical needs to discover information in
connection with their efforts to investigate crime and protect the
public interest. 3 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was
t Editor-in-Chief, ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW; J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St.
John's University School of Law; B.S., 2002, Cornell University.
1 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 64 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Project Gutenberg ed.
1994) (360 B.C.), availableat http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext94/repub13.txt.
2 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); see also Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) ("The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old
principle of respect for the privacy of the home."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
585 (1980) ("[Tjhe physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.") (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) ("A central concern [is] ... to
assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to
arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field."); Lauro
v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing the particular gravity the
Fourth Amendment accords to government intrusions on privacy of the home).
3 United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2005) (acknowledging the
need for law enforcement to have a certain amount of latitude in conducting criminal
investigations); Brown, 443 U.S. at 50 (noting that "[t]he reasonableness of
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designed to aid the courts in striking a balance between these
two conflicting interests: law enforcement must first establish
probable cause before a court will issue a search warrant. 4 But
despite the Fourth Amendment's guidance, courts have found it
difficult to strike such a balance because, in each case, the
individual's right to engage in a particular activity varies, as does
the nature of the crime under investigation. Not surprisingly,
the concept of probable cause has been subject to a great deal of
5
uncertainty because it must remain adaptable to all situations.
Recently, in United States v. Martin6 and United States v.
Coreas,7 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
8
defendants' memberships in online child pornography e-groups
were sufficient to establish probable cause for obtaining search
warrants of their computers and homes. 9
This Comment
critically analyzes both decisions and submits that Martin and
Coreas 1) erred in finding probable cause, and 2) consequently
established a precedent that seriously threatens First and Fourth
Amendment protections.

seizures... depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's
right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers") (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).
4 The full text of the Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) ("[P]robable cause is a fluid
concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contextsnot readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."); see also Holmes v.
State, 796 A.2d 90, 98 (2002) ('With the possible exception of 'due process,' there is
probably no two-word term in American law that has produced as much confusing
commentary as 'probable cause'.....
6 426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2005).
7 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2005).
8 An "e-group," also known as an internet forum, is a website that allows users
to interact by engaging in online chats and by posting messages, pictures, videos,
and other web-content. Martin, 426 F.3d at 70 n.1. Unlike most web pages where
one individual has permission to control the content of the page, e-group members
usually control the content of the e-group pages with very little supervision from the
individual who creates the e-group. See United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d 882, 885
(5th Cir. 2004).
9 See Martin, 426 F.3d at 73; see also Coreas, 419 F.3d at 159 (affirming Coreas'
conviction, therefore implicitly finding probable cause, because the court was bound
by the precedent set by Martin).
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These cases arose out of Operation Candyman ("Operation"),
a nationwide government investigation of persons suspected of
collecting and distributing child pornography over the internet. 10
During the investigation, the government searched the
computers and homes of numerous suspects 1 ' and eventually
arrested approximately ninety to one hundred individuals for the
possession of child pornography. 12 Most of the Operation's
searches were conducted pursuant to warrants supported by the
affidavit of FBI Special Agent Geoffrey S. Binney (the "Affidavit"
or "Binney's Affidavit").1 3 In the Affidavit, Binney outlined the
nature of five child pornography e-groups to which he subscribed
during his investigation.14 The two e-groups at issue in Martin
and Coreas were called Candyman and girlsl2-16.15 Candyman's
welcome page contained only text and stated "[t]his group is for
People who love kids. You can post any type of messages you like
too [sic] and any type of pics and vids you like too. P.S. IF WE
ALL WORKED [sic] TOGETHER WE WILL HAVE THE BEST
GROUP ON THE NET."' 6 In addition, the following description

10Martin, 426 F.3d at 69.
11 In one case, the government searched the suspect's work computer and
workplace. See United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826 (D. Neb. 2003).
12 The exact number of suspects searched and later charged is unclear. See 89
Charged, Some Clergy, in Web Child-PornRing, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at
A5; Tim Bryant, Two Area Men are Charged in Child Porn Sweep Internet Ring
Spanned 26 States, Officials Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 19, 2002, at B3
(1,400 Candyman members in United States); Jon Carroll, Operation Candyman
Gets Sticky, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 11, 2003, at D8 (700 homes searched); Larry
Neumeister, Judges Cite FBI Failingsin Child Porn Cases, CINCINNATI POST, Mar.
7, 2003, at 30 (more than 100 arrests); Jerry Seper, FBI Cracks Web Child-Porn,
Pedophile Ring, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at A03 (forty suspects already in
custody); David Stout, 90 Are Arrested in Inquiry into Internet Child-Sex Ring, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at A16.
13 See Coreas, 419 F.3d at 152 ("Binney... drafted an affidavit that law
enforcement officials around the country relied on to support applications for search
warrants to search the private residences of hundreds of people whose e-mail
addresses were on these lists."); Martin, 426 F.3d at 69-70; United States v.
Froman, 355 F.3d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d
390, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 830 (D. Neb.
2003); United States v. Fantauzzi, 260 F. Supp. 2d 561, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); United
States v. Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1137 (E.D. Mo. 2003); United States v.
Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
14 See Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
15 Coreas, 419 F.3d at 152; Martin, 426 F.3d at 70-72.
16 Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 391-92.
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was given in the center of the page: "Category: Top: Adult:
Image Galleries: Transgender: Members." 17 The girls12-16
welcome message indicated, even more explicitly, that the egroup was used for trading child pornography. 8 Despite the
differences in welcome messages, a first time user of either egroup "would have had some idea that the site provided access to
child pornography."' 19 Other than the differences in the welcome
messages, the Affidavit described both e-groups as having "many
of the same features." 20
Of particular importance was the
Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
The full text of the welcome message read:
Hi all, This group is for all those ho [sic] appreciate the young female in
here [sic] finest form. Watching her develop and grow is like poetry in
motion [sic], to an age where she takes an interest in the joys and pleasures
of sex. There is probably nothing more stimulating than watching a young
teen girl discover the pleasures of the orgasm. The joy of feeling like she is
actually coming into womanhood. It's an age where they have no
preconditions about anything, just pure opennes [sic]. What a joy to be a
part of that wonderful experience and to watch the development of this
perfect form. This is the place to be if you love 11 to 16 yr olds. You can
share experiences with others, share your views and opinions quite freely
without censorship. You can share all kinds of other information as well
regarding-your current model: if you are a photographer. Where the best
place to meet gitls [sic] is. The difficulties you experience in your quest. The
best way to chat up. Good places to pick girls up. Girls you would like to
share with others. The choice is all yours. Welcome home! Post videos and
photographs.., and how about your true life experiences with them so that
other viewers can paint a mental picture andin [sic] some ways share the
experience with you. You could connect with others from the same country
as you and get together sociall [sic] if you wish. The choice is all yours. How
about a model resource for photographers? It's all up to you and is only
limited by your own imaginations. Membership is open to anyone, but you
will need to post something. Mybe [sic] a little bit about yourself/what your
interests are (specifically), your age, location ... and a pic or vid would be a
good to [sic]. By doing this other members (or potential members) with the
same interest may then contact you if you wish them to.
Martin, 426 F.3d at 71.
19 Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
20 Martin, 426 F.3d at 71 n.3. The Affidavit stated that a user had access to the
following:
(1) a "Files" section allowed users to post images and video clips for other
members to access and download; (2) a "Polls" section "allowed Candyman
E-group members to answer survey questions, such as "what age group do
you prefer?"; (3) a "Links" section permitted members "to post URLs for
other web sites containing similar content"; (4) a "Chat" section enabled
members "to engage in real time chat conversations with each other"; (5) an
e-mail list, to which all new members were automatically added, circulated
messages and files when they were sent to the e-group; and (6) a
' Messages" area stored all the messages and files transmitted to the group
'7
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Affidavit's statement that all members automatically received emails from the groups. 2 1 From January 2, 2001, when Binney
joined the e-groups, until the e-groups were shutdown, Binney
received approximately 500 e-mails. 22 Of these 500, Binney
stated that approximately 300 e-mails contained files of child
pornography or child erotica. 2 3 Thus, according to the Affidavit,
all members of the e-groups during this period automatically
24
downloaded child pornography through their e-mail.
Binney's successor, Special Agent Kristen Sheldon, soon
discovered that there was reason to doubt some of Binney's
statements. 25 Specifically, Agent Sheldon was on notice that
there were, or at the very least that there might have been, email options for e-group users permitting them to choose not to
receive automatic downloaded messages. 26 In spite of her doubts,
in a draft affidavit based on Binney's original statements,
Sheldon indicated that upon joining, all e-group members
automatically received e-mails.2 7 In early 2002, Sheldon sent
this draft affidavit to some 700 FBI field offices around the
country. 28 Using the affidavit and the e-groups' membership
lists, several agents applied for and obtained search warrants for
various suspects' homes and computers. 29 Pursuant to these
warrants, the FBI searched the homes of suspected persons
nationwide and found many of them in possession of child
pornography. 30 Many of the suspects were arrested and charged
violation
of
child
pornography
in
with
possessing

so that members could review them later.
Id.

at 70. Because the Martin court asserts that only the welcome messages

distinguish the websites, this Comment will assume that all evidence, including
content and usage statistics, are applicable to both e-groups.
21 United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 2006).
22 Martin, 426 F.3d at 70.
23

Id.

See id.; see also Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
See Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 468-69.
26 Id. at 468.
27 Id. As the warrants were executed, more information emerged confirming
Sheldon's suspicions. Id.; see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
28 See Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 468-69.
29 Id. at 461.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1136 (E.D. Mo.
2003); Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 461.
24
25
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18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). 31 Martin and Coreas were two of
these defendants.
Subsequently, as some of the warrants were executed, Agent
Sheldon confirmed her doubts. Most importantly, Agent Sheldon
verified that not all members received the pornographycontaining e-mails automatically after joining the e-groups. 32 At
trial, the defendants sought to suppress the evidence collected
pursuant to the warrants. The defendants argued that the
statements made in the Affidavit were knowingly or recklessly
false and that the evidence, absent the false statements, was
33
insufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant.
Despite the shortcomings of Binney's Affidavit, in many of these
cases, the district courts upheld the validity of the search

31 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 2005). The statute provides in relevant
part:
(a) Any person who(5) either(A) in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, or on any land or building owned by, leased to, or otherwise
used by or under the control of the United States Government, or in
the Indian country (as defined in section 1151), knowingly possesses
any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any
other material that contains an image of child pornography; or
(B) knowingly possesses any book, magazine, periodical, film,
videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image
of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer, or that was produced using materials that have been
mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including by computer,
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
Id.
32 Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 468-69 ("In May 2002, Sheldon learned from an FBI
agent... that Yahoo had submitted an affidavit in a Candyman case stating that
there had been e-mail delivery options. ... At some point in mid-2002, the
Government started to acknowledge... that the search warrant affidavits had
contained an error ..
") (internal citation omitted).
33 See, e.g., United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 2005); Perez, 247
F. Supp. 2d at 469 ("[iDefendants in different Candyman cases moved to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of the search warrants."); see also United States v.
Schmidt, 373 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing several published and unpublished
Candyman opinions).
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warrants. 34
Martin and Coreas, along with these other
35
defendants, were convicted of possession of child pornography.
On appeal, Martin and Coreas once again argued that absent
the false statements, the evidence was insufficient to establish
probable cause for obtaining search warrants of their homes and
computers. 36 In Martin, the defendant was a member of the
girls12-16 e-group. 3 7 In that case, the Second Circuit outlined
the probable cause standard as requiring a judge to make a
"'practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him .. there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.' "38 After examining the e-group's
welcome message 39 and its technological features that facilitated
the trading of child pornography, 40 the court concluded that "the
overriding, if not the sole, purpose of the girls12-16 e-group was
illicit."41 The Affidavit extensively outlined the modus operandi
of child pornography collectors, explaining that they gather the
material through e-groups, e-mail, bulletin boards, and file
transfers, store it, and rarely destroy it.42 The Affidavit also
established that a girls12-16 member used the e-mail address
Joeym@optonline.net, that this member did not cancel his
membership during the Operation, and that this same member
was an occupant of Martin's house. 43 In the majority's view, this
remaining evidence established probable cause to issue the
search warrant; "[i]t is common sense that an individual who
34 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 824 (D. Neb. 2003). But
see United States v. Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(questioning the basis for Binney's conclusions in the Affidavit); United States v.
Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1137 (E.D. Mo. 2003) ("In fact, the vast majority of
Candyman subscribers, including defendant Strauser, had exercised the 'no mail'
option, where they did not receive emails ....); United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp.
2d at 463 (emphasizing the Government's efforts to notify defense counsel that parts
of the Affidavit were in fact false).
35 Coreas, 419 F.3d at 155; United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 69 (2d Cir.
2005).
36 Coreas, 419 F.3d at 155; Martin, 426 F.3d at 69.
37 Martin, 426 F.3d at 73 n.4. The district court mistakenly described Martin as
a member of Candyman e-group. Id.
38 Id. at 74 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)) (emphasis
omitted).
39 Id. at 75.

Id.
41 Id. at 74.
42 Id. at 75.
43 Id.
40
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joins such a site would more than likely download and possess
such material."44 The court distinguished the probable cause
standard from the standard necessary to establish a prima facie
case: "Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence.., have no place in
the magistrate's decision .... [I]t is clear that only the
probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is
the standard of probable cause." 45 The majority found this
probability standard satisfied, even though the Affidavit did not
specify that Martin downloaded child pornography, because
"proof of specific criminal conduct" was not required. 46 Having
found that the remaining evidence was sufficient to establish
probable cause, the court reasoned that it was not necessary to
reach the question of whether Binney's statements were
knowingly or recklessly false. 47 The court upheld Martin's
conviction, 48 but remanded the case for resentencing. 49
In dissent, Judge Pooler argued that the evidence presented,
absent Binney's false statements, was insufficient to establish
probable cause. 50
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, 51 only visual

44

Id.

45 Id.

at 74 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
46

See id. at 76 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 235).

47 See id. at 74.
48 See id. at 78. In upholding the conviction, the court completely disregarded
any argument based on First Amendment freedom of association. In fact, the court's
only mention of freedom of association came when it summarily dismissed
defendant's argument: 'Webelieve that our conclusion adequately balances the need
for law enforcement to have a certain amount of latitude in conducting criminal
investigations with the constitutional guarantees of free association and protection
against unlawful searches." Id. at 76. In the majority's view, the entire forum was
devoted to illicit purposes. See id. at 74 (stating that there were sufficient facts for
the magistrate to conclude that the sole purpose of the e-group was illicit). Because
the sole purpose of the e-group was illicit, it can be inferred from mere membership
in the e-group that there was a "substantial likelihood of criminal activity." See id.
at 76. The same cannot be said of mere membership in an "offensive or disreputable
group." See id.
49 The resentencing was ordered in accordance with United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005), which determined that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
are advisory, and United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2005),
which ruled that, under Booker, the court would normally remand a defendant's case
for determination by the sentencing judge of whether a materially different sentence
would have been imposed had the judge known that the Guidelines were advisory.
See Martin, 426 F.3d at 77-78.
50 See Martin, 426 F.3d at 79 (Pooler, J., dissenting) ("Agent Binney's false
statements provided the only basis for the inference that there was a fair probability
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depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct are
unlawful. 52 The dissent noted that the "vast majority" of the
girls12-16 subscribers opted not to receive visual depictions of
children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 53 The dissent also
noted that the government failed to provide evidence that Martin
downloaded child pornography, and that the corrected Affidavit
only supported the inference that he had used the legal, textbased functions of the site-activities that were outside the
purview of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 54 Finally, the dissent challenged
the majority's characterization of the e-group as having the
overriding purpose of trading illegal child pornography, 55 but
stated that:
Even assuming arguendo that the girlsl2-16 E-group was
wholly dedicated to an illegal purpose and that membership in a
wholly illegal organization is a proper basis for probable cause,
the affidavit is still insufficient ...because it ...lack[s] the

requisite nexus between Martin and the trading of illegal visual
depictions.56

The defendant in Coreas was a member of the Candyman egroup. 57
In that case, a different Second Circuit panel
5
unanimously agreed with Judge Pooler's reasoning in Martin 8
but, nevertheless, being bound by precedent, upheld the
conviction of the defendant. 59 The Coreas court, supporting
that all E-group subscribers would possess illegal visual depictions.").
51 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. 2005).
52 See Martin, 426 F.3d at 78-79 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
53 See id. at 79 n.8 (quoting United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 482-83
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). For the purpose of this discussion, images include any visual
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computergenerated image or picture.
54 See id. at 80 & n.11.
55 See id. at 80-81.

Id. at 81 n.12.
See United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 152 (2d Cir. 2005).
58 See id. at 159 ("For these reasons, as well as for the many other reasons so
well articulated by Judge Pooler in her dissent in Martin, we believe Martin itself
was wrongly decided."). Prior to the holdings in Martin and Coreas, some Second
Circuit courts had followed a similar line of reasoning and invalidated search
warrants supported by Binney's Affidavit. See United States v. Kunen, 323 F. Supp.
2d 390, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 481
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); accord United States v. Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1135-36
(E.D. Mo. 2003).
59 See Coreas, 419 F.3d at 159 ("Nonetheless, since the Martin case was heard
first, we are compelled, under established rules of this circuit, to affirm Coreas'
conviction."). The Coreas court also recognized that upholding the search warrant
56

57
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Judge Pooler's arguments, noted that of the approximately 500
e-mails received by Binney during his investigation, about 100
e-mails contained content which fell within the prohibitions of
18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 60 In addition, during the period of Binney's
investigation, "more than 85 percent of the Candyman members
elected [not] to receive . . . automatic emails."6 1 Thus, the court
explained, any given member was unlikely to have received
automatic e-mails during the investigation. 62
The court
concluded that the government failed to present any specific
evidence that Coreas had downloaded child pornography; 63 rather
the government relied on evidence of the proclivities of child
pornography collectors and attempted to classify Coreas as a
collector by showing that he clicked the subscribe button on the
website. 64
The court believed that without Binney's false
statements, the remaining evidence did not support probable
cause. 65 In addition, the court stated that Binney's statements
were made with reckless disregard for the truth.66 The court
concluded that the Martin rule would "chill the rights of speech
and association guaranteed by the First Amendment." 67 It then
tried to distinguish Coreas from Martin because the defendants
belonged to different e-groups; 68 however, it later rejected this
might "chill the rights of speech and association guaranteed by the First
Amendment." Id. at 156. The court continued:
That Candyman was a forum for a repugnant viewpoint does not alone
support an inference of criminal conduct. Coreas broke no laws in joining
the group and visiting its website, provided that he did not download any
child pornography while there (and there was no allegation that he did).
Many of the activities Candyman facilitated, such as members' chatting
with each other, are protected by the First Amendment. Where an
organization is not so "wholly illegitimate" that membership itself
necessarily implies criminal conduct, membership alone cannot provide
probable cause.
Id. at 156-57 (quoting United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 1991)).
60 See id. at 152.
61 Id. at 154. The Martin court cited no similar statistics for the girls12-16 egroup, but because nearly all website hosts can track usage, there is no reason to
believe that such statistics would not have been available to the government had it
tried to obtain them.
62 See id. at 154.
63 See id. at 153.
64 See id. at 153-54.
65 See id. at 156
66 See id.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 157 ("Arguably Martin might be distinguished from the instant case

on the ground that the defendant there had joined a different group, girls12-16.").
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distinction because the Martin court found the differences
between the websites immaterial. 69 Only two weeks after the
decision in Martin, despite its complete disagreement with the
Martin majority, the court upheld Coreas' conviction. 70 Both
Martin and Coreas filed petitions for rehearing; however, both
71
motions were denied.
This Comment submits that the Martin court erroneously
refused to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search
warrant for Martin's home and computer. Part I describes the
general requirements for suppressing evidence obtained
pursuant to a faulty search warrant. Part II first defines the
phrase "reckless disregard for the truth," then contends that
Agent Binney's Affidavit contained recklessly false or misleading
material.
Next, Part III sets out the requirements for
establishing probable cause. It then argues that Agent Binney's
statements and omissions were material to the finding of
probable cause because membership in an organization that has
both legal and illegal purposes is, without more, insufficient to
establish probable cause to obtain a search warrant for a
suspect's computer and home. 72 Finally, Part IV suggests
reasons for Martin's misapplication of the probable cause
standard and why, as a policy matter, requiring evidence of an
individual's wrongdoing is a better option than the rule
suggested by the Martin majority. Even assuming that the
primary purposes of the e-groups were illicit, probable cause was
not established by membership in the e-groups without a
69 Id. Although the girls12-16 welcome message was more sexually explicit, the
Martin majority "regarded the Candyman welcome message as explicit enough to
warrant an inference of unlawful purpose." Id.
70
71

Id. at 159.
United States v. Coreas, 426 F.3d 615, 617 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam)

[hereinafter Coreas I]; United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2005)

[hereinafter Martin II]. Interestingly, in Martin II, the Second Circuit stated that
"[a]lthough the Candyman welcome message was not before this panel, we need to
clarify that we do not view the differences between the two welcome messages as
'immaterial.' To the contrary, the girls12-16 welcome message was an integral
component of our probable cause determination." Id. at 86. The Coreas II court still
found no distinction. See Coreas II, 426 F.3d at 616.
72 For purposes of illustration, this Comment will draw on the similar facts of
other cases related to Operation Candyman and argue that the majority rule applied
in those cases is incorrect. Because information regarding the Candyman e-group is
most accessible from the court records, many of the statistics cited are in reference
to Candyman and Candyman users, however the arguments apply to both websites
and their users. See supra note 20.
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showing that the individuals had engaged in some illegal
activity, and while the information establishing the individuals'
participation, or lack thereof, was available to the government.
I.

SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO A
SEARCH WARRANT

In Franks v. Delaware,73 the Supreme Court stated for the
first time that, after the issuance of a search warrant, a criminal
defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment right to challenge the
truthfulness of statements made in an affidavit supporting the
warrant. 74 Franks involved a defendant who was accused of
committing rape, kidnapping, and burglary. 75 The victim, Mrs.
Cynthia Bailey, told the police during her statement that the
defendant confronted her with a knife in her home and forced her
to engage in sexual relations. 76 Among other things, she
described the assailant's clothing: a white thermal undershirt,
black pants with a silver or gold buckle, a brown leather threequarter-length coat, and a dark knit cap. 77 Two detectives,
suspecting Franks as the offender and desiring to search his
apartment, later submitted a sworn affidavit in support of a
search warrant application to the Justice of the Peace in Dover,
Delaware. 78 The affidavit stated that the affiants had spoken
directly with Wesley Lucas and James D. Morrison, two people
from Franks' place of employment, and that these coworkers had
jointly described Franks' "normal dress" as consisting of a white
knit thermal undershirt, a brown leather jacket, and a dark
green knit cap. 79 At trial, however, defendant's counsel sought to
call Lucas and Morrison to testify that neither of them had been
personally interviewed by the affiants and that, while they had
talked to another police officer, the information given to them by
that officer was somewhat different from what was included in
Defense counsel asserted that the misthe affidavit.8 0
representations were material to the finding of probable cause

73 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
74 Id. at 155-56.
75

Id. at 156.

76
77

Id.
Id.

78

Id. at 157.

79 Id.
80 Id.

at 158.

2006]

THE CANDYMAN WARRANTS

1103

and were included in bad faith. 8 ' The trial judge refused to allow
the defendant to call Lucas and Morrison for the purpose of
attacking the veracity of the statements in the affidavit and the
defendant was convicted on all counts.8 2 The conviction was
subsequently affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court and the
83
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Franks' conviction.
The Court held that while an affidavit supporting a search
84
warrant is presumed to be valid:
where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing
that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in
the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is
necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's
85
request.
If, at such hearing, the defendant proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that a false statement was included in a search
warrant affidavit knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for its truth, and the remaining material in the
affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause,
"the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search
excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on
the face of the affidavit. 8s6 Because Franks had preliminarily
established that the false statements were either knowingly or
recklessly included in the warrant affidavit, he was entitled to
present evidence as to their falsity at the hearing.8 7 Thus, the
Court reversed and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of
88
Delaware.
The Second Circuit has since clarified the Franks standard.
Not every statement in the supporting affidavit must be true for
it to survive the defendant's suppression motion.8 9 If the false
81
82

Id.
Id. at 160.

83 Id. at 160-61.
84 Id. at 171.

Id. at 155-56 (emphasis added).
Id. at 156.
87 Id. at 171.
88 Id. at 172.
89 United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 717 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. Trzaska, 111 F.3d 1019, 1027 (2d Cir. 1997)). The government conceded
that the search warrant contained false information and that it was not true that e85
86
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statement was unnecessary to the magistrate's finding of
probable cause, suppression of the evidence is inappropriate. 90
Omissions from the affidavit are governed by the same
standard. 9 1 Thus, "material omissions made with an intent to
mislead or with a reckless disregard for the truth also must be
corrected before the court considers the sufficiency of a search
warrant affidavit." 92 The question of whether the untainted
portions of the affidavit support probable cause is a legal one;
93
hence, the Circuit Court must review the decision de novo.
II.

BINNEY'S STATEMENTS WERE INCLUDED WITH RECKLESS
DISREGARD FOR THE TRUTH

What Does It Mean To Recklessly Include or Omit Material
Evidence Without Regard for the Truth?
After Franks,9 4 the definition of recklessness in the Fourth
Amendment context was at first largely undefined. 95 This lack of
clarity came about because "the Supreme Court in Franks gave
no guidance concerning what constitutes a reckless disregard for
the truth in Fourth Amendment cases, except to state that
'negligence or innocent mistake [is] insufficient.' "96 As a result,
several circuits have analogized from the First Amendment libel
standard. 97 To prove that the affiant recklessly disregarded the
A.

group members received all e-mails automatically. United States v. Perez,
247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
90 See Canfield, 212 F.3d at 717-18; Franks, 438 U.S. at 172 n.8 (reasoning that
if what is left is sufficient to establish probable cause, the inaccuracies are
irrelevant).
91 Canfield, 212 F.3d at 718 (citing United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 848

(2d Cir. 1985)).
92 Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 473 (citing Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 787-88
(3d Cir. 2000)).
93 United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Canfield,
212 F.3d at 718).
94 438 U.S. 154 (1978); see discussion supra Part I.
95 Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 473 ("Little precedent exists to define 'reckless
disregard' in the search warrant context.").
96 United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Franks,
438 U.S. at 171).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Ranney, 298 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d
614, 621 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Schmitz, 181 F.3d 981, 986-87 (8th Cir.
1999); United States v. Senchenko, 133 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1998); Beard v.
City of Northglenn, 24 F.3d 110, 116 (10th Cir. 1994); Davis, 617 F.2d at 694.
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truth, the defendant must show "that the affiant 'in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth' of the allegations." 98
The defendant may meet this burden "not only by showing [the
affiant's] actual deliberation but also by demonstrating 99 that
"'they had obvious reasons to doubt [the statements']
veracity.'

"100

Intentional or reckless omissions of material

information may also serve as the basis for a Franks challenge.1° 1
Where the omission of information is involved, "[r]ecklessness
may be inferred [if] the omitted information was clearly critical
' 10 2
to the probable cause determination."
B. The FBI Recklessly Included Binney's Statements and
Recklessly Omitted Other MaterialEvidence
A majority of the courts in the Candyman cases have

declined to reach the issue of whether the statements in Agent
Binney's Affidavit were knowingly or recklessly false because
they believe that the warrants were supported by probable cause,
even absent consideration of the false statements. 103 In the few
cases that have answered the question, courts have split.104

98 Ranney, 298 F.3d at 78 (quoting United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602
(7th Cir. 1984) (agreeing with Davis, 617 F.2d at 694)).
99 Davis, 617 F.2d at 694.
100 Coreas, 419 F.3d at 155 (quoting Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 479).
101 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 604 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing United
States v. Campino, 890 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1989)).
102 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 277 (3d Cir. 2006); United

States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d
882, 884, 888 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Because the affidavit supports a finding of probable
cause even without the alleged false statements, we affirm the district court's denial
of Froman's suppression motion."); see also United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d
822, 824 (D. Neb. 2003) (stating that because of Yahoo's irresponsible behavior, it
was impossible to determine whether the FBI had intentionally or recklessly
included false and incomplete information in the affidavit); United States v.
Fantauzzi, 260 F. Supp. 2d 561, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (refusing to reach the question
on other grounds).
104 See, e.g., Coreas, 419 F.3d at 152-53 (finding that the government made the
statements with reckless disregard for the truth and adopting the findings of United
States v. Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1143 (E.D. Mo. 2003), and Perez,
247 F. Supp. 2d at 480); United States v. Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395-96
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Strauser, 247 F. Supp 2d at 1143; Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 480.
But see United States v. Bailey 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 837 (D. Neb. 2003) (assuming,
for the purposes of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, that the statements
were made recklessly, but casting serious doubt on that assumption and later
finding that the warrant was sufficiently supported by probable cause).
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However, only the courts in United States v. Strauser10 5 and
United States v. Perez10 6 conducted full evidentiary hearings, and
both courts found that the FBI acted with reckless disregard for
the truth. 107
In the course of Agent Binney's investigation, he joined
Candyman and seven other e-groups.10 8 Binney testified that he
had joined Candyman by copying the e-mail address listed under
"Subscribe" on the website homepage, pasting that address into
an e-mail, and sending the e-mail.1 0 9 He also testified that he did
not register by clicking the "subscribe" button on the website, nor
did he explore the other buttons on the page. 110 Thus, the
government argued, at the time of the issuance of the search
warrants, the FBI did not act recklessly by including the
statements
that
all
e-group
users
received
e-mails
automatically."1 1 Nevertheless, the evidence shows that Agent
Binney plainly joined Candyman through web registration and
that the government recklessly disregarded the evidence that
other members could have chosen not to receive e-mails
automatically.
On February 9, 2001, in response to a subpoena, Yahoo
released a set of documents to the FBI. 11 2 One of the documents
indicated that there were e-mail options for users. 113 On
January 18, 2002, Yahoo produced additional documents and a
computer disk.11 4 In a one-page group profile of the Candyman egroup, a category called "number of subscribers" indicated the
following data: of the total 3,213 users, 473 users chose to
receive e-mail messages while 2,740 users chose to receive no email at all. 11 5 On January 24, 2002, Agent Sheldon met with
105 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
106 247 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Strauser,247 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 480.
108 Strauser,247 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-40.
109 Id. at 1139.
107

110

Id.

1I Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 480 ("The Government argues that, at worst, the

agents made the false statement negligently, and that Perez is merely complaining
that the agents should have done a more thorough investigation, when the law is
clear that a failure to fully investigate is not sufficient to show reckless disregard.");
see Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 ("The government correctly points out that
Franks issues cannot be viewed with the benefit of hindsight.").
112 Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
113 Id.
114

Id. at 467-68.

115

Id. at 468, 479.
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Yahoo representatives. 1 6 When asked if there were e-mail
options for the e-groups, the representatives told Agent Sheldon
17
that they were unsure and would get back to her.
Approximately two months later, Sheldon interviewed Mark
Bates, the former moderator of the Candyman e-group. 118 Bates
told Sheldon that e-group members who registered by e-mail
were automatically added to the e-mail list, while those who
registered on the Candyman website could opt out of this
feature;" 9 Sheldon apparently did not believe Bates. 120 Finally,
logs from Yahoo showed that all web subscribers were presented
with e-mail delivery options.' 21 One Yahoo official testified that,
according to Yahoo's source code log, Binney had clearly
subscribed via the website. 122 Therefore, not only was Binney
given an e-mail delivery option when he registered on
Candyman, but he also was given this same choice on numerous
other occasions. 123 In fact, Binney had signed up for all of the
other seven e-groups via the web. 24 Although Binney testified
that normally he would have printed and saved any e-mails that
he sent during an operation like this, he had no record of any emails that he sent to subscribe to the Candyman e-group, nor did
125
he prepare any written record of sending such an e-mail.
Despite the evidence, Sheldon based the draft affidavit on

116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.

at 479.
at 468 (citation omitted).

119 See United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 833 (D. Neb. 2003); see also
Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 465, 468.
120 See Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 833. Apparently Sheldon did not credit Bates'
statements because he "was the subject of a significant criminal investigation; the
moderator of not only the Candyman E-group, but also the Candyman2,
Candyman3, and Candyman4 E-groups; and was a member of 170 other Egroups.... Mr. Bates' credibility and memory concerning the delivery options
associated specifically with the Candyman E-group was suspect." Id.
121 See id.
122 Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 466. A log was only generated when a subscriber
joined via the web. Id.
123 Id. at 467. The court found that Binney was given the e-mail options choice
on six of the other seven websites because Yahoo log data was unavailable for one of
the e-groups. Id.
124 United States v. Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139-40 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
The record reflected that Binney attempted to sign up for one e-group via e-mail,
however his e-mail was bounced back. He then subscribed to that group via the web.
Id. at 1140.
125 Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
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Binney's original statements and indicated that, upon joining, all
126
e-group members automatically received e-mails.
Taking all of the evidence together, the government's
representations that all e-group users automatically received email was obviously not the result of an innocent mistake or
negligence. Binney stated that he assumed all members went
through the same process as he did; therefore, he was unaware
that there were e-mail options. 127 But Binney also testified that
128
he had explored the Candyman website after he subscribed.
As the court in Perez stated: "It is hard to imagine that [Binney]
would not have clicked on the 'subscribe' button at some
point.... One would expect that an FBI agent acting in an
undercover capacity would have ... explored thoroughly the
process by which members came to receive e-mails, given the
significance of the issue .
,,129 In addition, Agent Sheldon must
have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statements
in the Affidavit. 130
Not until July 2002, however, did the
government first notify the defendants that some of the
statements in the Affidavit might have been incorrect. 3 1 The
government knew that "if someone. . . did not get e-mails, then
32
there would be no real basis to prosecute such a person[.]"'
Nevertheless, the government failed to disclose such information
despite its knowledge that this information would have been
critical to the magistrate's probable cause determination.
III. BINNEY'S STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS WERE MATERIAL TO A
FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE

A.

EstablishingProbableCause for Search Warrants

Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant exists
when known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a
person of reasonable prudence to believe that contraband or
See id. at 468.
Id. at 470.
128 Id. at 467.
129 Id.
130 "Even though [Sheldon] did not hear back from the Yahoo representatives
after the January 24, 2002 meeting, and even though she knew this was an 'open
question,' she sent out the draft search warrant with the representation that all
members automatically received all e-mails." Id. at 468.
131 United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 2005).
132 Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 480.
126

127
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evidence is located in a particular place 133 or that an offense has
been or is being committed. 134 The very name implies that the
courts must deal with probabilities.1 35 It is not a technical
determination, but rather something that must be determined
from the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent individuals, not legal technicians,
act. 36 Jurors as fact finders, law enforcement officers, and
magistrate judges may formulate common sense conclusions
about human behavior. 137 The standard for probable cause,
unlike determinations of guilt or liability, is a relaxed one 138 that
requires "'less than evidence which would justify... conviction,'
but 'more than bare suspicion.' "1139 The magistrate must consider
the totality of the facts and circumstances before him;' 40 thus,
even if an innocent explanation is consistent with the facts
41
alleged, probable cause is not automatically negated.'
The totality of the circumstances must also present
"particularized suspicion."1 42 In other words, the "assessment of
the whole picture must ...raise a suspicion that the particular

133

134
135

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175

(1949)).

See id. (citing Brinegar,338 U.S. at 175).
See id. at 231-32, 238 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981)). The inquiry is essentially the same, regardless of whether it is made by the
magistrate upon application for a warrant or the law enforcement officer before
searching without a warrant, because the existence of probable cause is a common136
137

sense determination. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1 (4th ed. 2004), for a discussion of the similarities
and differences. But where possible, warrants are preferred. United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965) (citations omitted). This preference stems
from the Court's belief that Fourth Amendment protections are best preserved when
the "neutral and detached magistrate" judge rather than the "zealous
officers.. . engaged in... ferreting out crime" makes the determination. Id. at 106
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)). Thus, "in a doubtful
or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it
would fall." Id.
138 See United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2005).
139 Id. (quoting Brinegar,338 U.S. at 175-76).
140 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Amongst other considerations, the magistrate
may look to "various objective observations, [including] information from police
reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation
of certain kinds of lawbreakers." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
141 See Martin, 426 U.S. at 77 (quoting United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834,
838 (2d Cir. 1985)).
142 Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418).
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individual.., is engaged in wrongdoing." 143 In fact, the "demand
for specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of [the Supreme] Court's Fourth
144
Generally, membership in an
Amendment jurisprudence."'
organization alone does not establish this particularized
suspicion.145 The First Amendment restricts the ability of the
State to impose a "'blanket prohibition of association with a
group having both legal and illegal aims.' "146 Indeed such a
blanket prohibition would pose " 'a real danger that legitimate
political expression or association would be impaired .... , "147 To
impose liability, therefore, the State must show that the
defendant specifically intended to accomplish the goals of the
organization. 148 Another rule would allow punishment of the
individual who adheres to the organization's "lawful and
constitutionally protected purposes, because of other and
149
unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share."
The State may not "broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
1 50
when the end can be more narrowly achieved."
Thus, in United States v. Rubio,1 51 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that "proof of mere membership in the
Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, without a link to actual criminal
activity, was insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause."1 52 Establishing probable cause through membership
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
144 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968)); see Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979) ("[W]e have required the officers to have a reasonable
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal
activity.... The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users,
standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in
criminal conduct.") (emphasis added).
145 See United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1984)).
146 NAACP v. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 919 (1982) (quoting Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961)).
147 United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 328 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Scales, 367 U.S. at 229) abrogatedon other grounds by United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 234 (2005).
148 See Claiborne,458 U.S. at 919.
149 Id. (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961)).
150 Id. at 920 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1984).
152 United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Rubio, 727
F.2d at 790, 793). It is interesting to note the court's protection of the First
Amendment rights of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, an "organization proved to
be involved in numerous types of criminal activity on a nationwide basis with a
143
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would only be appropriate "[ijf such a large portion of the subject
organization's activities [were] illegitimate so that the enterprise
could be considered, in effect, wholly illegitimate . .. ."153
Because the court did not find that a large portion of Hells
Angels' activities were illegitimate, membership alone could not
be used to establish probable cause. 154 In United States v.
Brown, 55 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Rubio. In
that case, the defendants were law enforcement officers assigned
to a narcotics and money laundering detection unit known as
Majors 2.156 During a sting operation, it was determined that
several members of Majors 2 were engaged in stealing money and
other items during narcotics raids. 157 Subsequently, federal
agents sought warrants to search the homes of all Majors 2
members.15 8
The supporting affidavits stated that the
defendants were members of Majors 2 and characterized Majors
2 as a wholly illegitimate operation, but they did not allege that
the defendants either stole money themselves or witnessed the
stealing by other members. 159 Pursuant to the warrants, federal
officials searched the homes of the defendants and found large
sums of money, including cash used in the sting.160
The
defendants were convicted but, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the government's characterization of the organization as
wholly illegitimate.1 61 The court held that, even if there was a
widespread conspiracy, the warrants had failed to establish
62
probable cause to believe that the defendants were involved.

propensity for violence." United States v. Pasciuti, 803 F. Supp. 499, 513 (D. N.H.
1992). The Ku Klux Klan is also entitled to First Amendment protection, even
though it is an organization dedicated to furthering the "ignoble goal of white

supremacy," Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven,
600 F. Supp. 1427, 1429 (D. Conn. 1985), through the use of "unlawful intimidation
and violence." Gremillion v. NAACP, 181 F. Supp. 37, 39 (E.D. La. 1960).
153 Brown, 951 F.2d at 1003 (quoting Rubio, 727 F.2d at 793).
154 Rubio, 727 F.2d at 795 ('The record is replete with instances of individual
criminal behavior by members and associates of the Club, but we find no connection
between such individual activity and the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise as a
whole.").
155 United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1991).
156 Id. at 1000.
157 Id. at 1001.
158

Id.

159 Id.
161

at 1003.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1003.

162

Id.

160
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B.

Binney's False Statements and Omissions Were Material To
FindingProbable Cause: Membership Alone Did Not
Establish Probable Cause That Members Were Engaged in
Illegal Conduct
Agent Binney's statements likely established circumstances
that were sufficient to warrant individuals of reasonable
prudence to believe that Candyman and girls12-16 members
were in possession of child pornography. 163 Without these false
statements, however, the probability that members were in
possession of child pornography was greatly reduced. Moreover,
without Binney's false statements, there was no particularized
suspicion that Martin or Coreas were engaged in wrongdoing; 164
such conclusions are borne out by the results of the searches. 165
The Coreas court noted that "[tihe record of this appeal is silent
as to what resulted from most of the other 23 searches, but public
records of the Eastern District of New York indicate that many of
the persons whose residences were searched were never charged
with any crime."'166 Thus, these results demonstrate that, based
on membership evidence alone, the e-groups' users were actually
unlikely to be in possession of illicit material. 167
According to Agent Binney's affidavit, after receiving
confirmation of one's registration, a member of the Candyman
website could "download... approximately 100 images and video
clips of prepubescent minors engaged in sexual activities, the
genitalia of nude minors, and child erotica ....
Of these, the
majority of the images and video clips fell into the first
category."' 68 But members could have participated in other areas
163 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (probable cause findings are
made according to a "reasonable and prudent [person]" standard).
164 See United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 2005); United States
v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 80 n.l (2d Cir. 2005) (Pooler, J., dissenting).
165 After conducting searches during Operation Candyman, the FBI found that
many members of the girls12-16 and Candyman e-groups were in possession of child
pornography. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The overwhelming number
of searches, however, yielded no illicit material. See infra notes 166-67 and
accompanying text.
166 Coreas, 419 F.3d at 154 n.2.
167 Id. at 154. According to another FBI agent's affidavit, the Candyman e-group
alone had 3,397 members at the time of Agent Binney's investigation. United States
v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). There may have been as many as
6,300 subscribers during its full time of operation. Id. at 465. Some individuals must
have subscribed and then later unsubscribed.
168 Perez, 247 F. Supp. at 462 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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of the e-groups that did not contain images at all. 169 Trading and
downloading images 170 were two of the several activities in which
members of the e-groups could engage; Candyman and girls12-16
members could "post images and videos for other members to
download[,] ... answer survey questions[,] ... post links to other
websites[,] and.., engage in 'real time conversations with each
other.' "171 But even users who traded and downloaded images
were not necessarily downloading child pornography. Child
pornography, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256, includes any "visual
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture," of "a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."' 172 The acts of trading or
possessing these visual depictions are criminal offenses under
Nonetheless, the statute "does not
18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 173
criminalize ... the trading of visual depictions of children that
are not sexually explicit but are 'sexually arousing to a given
individual' (referred to in the affidavit as 'child erotica')." 174 In
addition, § 2252A does not criminalize "the trading of textual
depictions of any kind,"'175 even if the text vividly describes
children engaged in sexually explicit activities.

169 The "Chat" and "Poll" sections of the site were only text-based, while the
"Links" section provided web-links to other sites where images could be found. Id. at
464.
170 For the purpose of this discussion, images include any visual depiction,
including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated
image or picture.
171 Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (citation omitted).
172 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (Supp. 2005). The statute provides in relevant part:
(8) "child pornography" means any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image
or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means, of sexually explicit conduct, where(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or
computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to
appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.
Id.
173 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. 2005).
174 United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2005) (Pooler, J.,
dissenting).
175 Id.
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The e-mails distributed during Binney's investigation
contained a mixture of images and text, but during Binney's
investigation, 85 percent of the Candyman members chose not to
receive automatic e-mails from the group. 176 Moreover, even if a
member decided to receive e-mails, of the approximately 500 emails received by Agent Binney, over 400 did not contain illegal
material. 177 Therefore, according to the government's evidence,
any member who did not participate in the file posting area was
actually more likely to have engaged in legal activities. Such
evidence, without considering Binney's false statements, cannot
establish probable cause by itself. Thus, without more than
evidence of the defendants' membership, the Martin and Coreas
courts should have invalidated the warrants used to search the
defendants' homes, excluded the evidence obtained pursuant to
those warrants, and overturned the defendants' convictions.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARTIN DECISION: PARTICULARIZED
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE REQUIRED

TO

ESTABLISH

PROBABLE CAUSE

A.

Why Did the Court in Martin Reach Its Decision and Why Do
Most Courts Agree?
Most courts have agreed with Martin's reasoning. 78 Similar
holdings are likely the result of society's disgust with child
79
pornographers who are inherently linked to sexual predators.

United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 2005).
See United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
see also Martin II, 426 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2005) (Pooler, J., dissenting) ("In fact,
child erotica constituted almost eighty five percent of the pictures e-mailed to Agent
Binney while he was a member of the group, making it far more prevalent on the
site than illegal child pornography."). The Perez court pointed out that there was a
discrepancy over the number of e-mails that contained file attachments. Perez, 247
F. Supp. 2d at 464, 465 n.3. According to the original affidavits used to obtain the
search warrants, approximately 100 e-mails contained child pornography. During
Binney's testimony, however, he stated that a little over 100 e-mails contained
either child erotica or child pornography; most of the 100 contained child erotica, but
a "substantial number" contained child pornography. Id. at 464. Because some of the
statements in the affidavits were not based on personal knowledge, the Perez court
accepted Binney's testimony as containing the more accurate estimations. Id. at 465
n.3.
17S See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
179 See Ethel Quayle & Max Taylor, Model of ProblematicInternet Use in People
with a Sexual Interest in Children, 6 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 93, 94 (2003)
(classifying those who download child pornography on the internet as a new category
176
177
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Pedophiles particularly concern society because their crimes
severely impact children and because they show high recidivism
rates.1 8 0 While all children do not react in the same way to
sexual abuse, therapists agree that some of the most common
symptoms experienced by child victims include sleeping and
eating disturbances, feelings of anger, withdrawal, guilt, fear,
and anxiousness.18 1 Other victims experience symptoms similar
to those of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, sometimes having
flashbacks and recurrent dreams about the events.1 8 2 Still others
become phobic about sexual intimacy altogether.1 8 3 Yet the most
troubling and consistent finding is that many victims later
become abusers themselves. 8 4 Perhaps it is because of the
horrific nature of their crimes that much of society takes notice
when the government cracks down on these criminals.

of sexual offender, but noting that there may have been no contact with a victim);
Seper, supra note 12, at A03 ("Operation Candyman, involved all the bureau's 56
field offices, and that of the 40 suspects already in custody, 27 admitted to molesting
36 children.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Although those who download
child pornography do not necessarily have any contact with the child victim, clearly
the people forcing the children into posing for sexually explicit material do have
contact.
180 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM
PRISON IN 1994 1-2, 13 (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/rsorp94.htm
(tracking 9,691 male sex offenders released from 15 state prisons in 1994 and
finding that, within the first 3 years following their release, 43% (4,163 of the 9,691)
were rearrested for at least 1 new crime, 24% (2,326 of the 9,691) were reconvicted
for any type of crime and 11.2% (1,085 of the 9,691) were returned to prison with
another sentence). In addition, the report noted that the true extent to which sex
offender's recidivate is difficult to determine because many crimes do not result in
arrest. Id. at 6. Victims of crimes committed by family members and in nonpublic
places are less likely to report the abuse. Id.; see also Joyce R. Lombardi, Because
Sex Crimes Are Different: Why Maryland Should (Carefully) Adopt the Contested
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 That Permit Propensity Evidence of a
CriminalDefendant's Other Sex Offenses, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 103, 120 (2004) (noting
that studies consistently show that many convicted child molesters have each
committed numerous, even hundreds, of sex offenses that go unreported).
is1 Alfie Kohn, Shattered Innocence; Childhood Sexual Abuse Is Yielding Its
Dark Secrets to the Cold Light of Research, 21 PSYCHOL. TODAY 54, 54 (1987).
182 Id. at 2.
183 Id.
184 See Carol Veneziano, Louis Veneziano & Scott LeGrand, The Relationship
Between Adolescent Sex Offender Behaviors and Victim Characteristics with Prior

Victimization, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 363, 364 (2000) ("Prior sexual

victimization of sex offenders has been a consistent finding across the adult and
juvenile literature despite considerable differences in sample selection and data
collection.").

1116

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.80:1091

Judges, while isolated from society in some sense, cannot be
immune to these social concerns, nor can they, as humans, be
completely unaffected by emotion in these cases. The courts in
suppress the
the Candyman cases faced a difficult choice:
or adapt the
of
defendants,
the
convictions
evidence and reverse
"plastic concept"' 85 of probable cause to allow the search of the
homes of defendants that we now know were in possession of
child pornography. Making this choice might have been even
more difficult in light of Yahoo's lack of cooperation during the
entire investigation, making it harder for the government to
collect the necessary evidence.' 86 Given these circumstances, a
court might understandably err on the side of the government.
Unfortunately, the rules set out in Martin and Coreas extend far
beyond the child pornography context.
Policy Requires a Different Standard
The Martin court was correct when it asserted that it is
"'common sense' that one who 'voluntarily joins' a childof the
group
and 'remains a member
pornography
group... without canceling his subscription.., would download
such pornography from the website and have it in his
Indeed, "[k]nowingly becoming a computer
possession.' "187
subscriber to a specialized internet site that frequently,
automatically
and
sometimes
unquestionably
obviously,
distributes electronic images of child pornography to other
computer subscribers" makes it more likely that the suspect is
downloading child pornography. 8 8 This should not, however, be
the end of the inquiry.
It may be common sense that an individual who knowingly
joins the Communist Party and associates with comrades who
B.

185United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("It is 'a plastic
concept whose existence depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.' ") (quoting Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).

186 During the investigation, Binney "informally asked Yahoo! for information,
but encountered significant resistance." United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d
822, 828 (D. Neb. 2003). He was also told that "he would never speak to a technical
representative." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although a grand jury
subpoena stated, "PLEASE DO NOT SHUT DOWN THE SITE/ADDRESS OR
DENY ACCESS UNTIL REQUESTED TO DO SO BY THE INVESTIGATING
AGENT[,]" Yahoo shut down the site approximately two weeks later. Id.
187 United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d 882, 890-91 (5th Cir. 2004)).
188 Id. at 75-76 (quoting Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 824-25).
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advocate the violent overthrow of the government is, himself,
more likely than others to attempt to overthrow the
government.189 Members of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club
may be more likely than the average citizen to possess
contraband. 190 An individual standing in an alley in an area
frequented by drug users may be more likely to possess drugs. 191
A tavern patron may possess heroine if he associates with the
bartender, who himself regularly possesses heroin. 192 Indeed, a
former member of an internet e-group that distributes child
pornography is more likely to possess child pornography than the
ordinary internet user. 193 But while these presumptions may be
"common sense,"' 94 they seem to be at odds with Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
Generalized findings about an
organization that conducts both lawful-albeit reprehensibleand unlawful activities should not be sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause for a search of its members' homes. 95
189 Contra Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (affirming
defendant's conviction not solely because he was member of Communist Party,
which advocated the violent overthrow of federal government, but because he was
proven to have knowledge of the organization's proscribed advocacy and he
specifically intended to accomplish the illegal aims of the organization through
violence).
190 Contra United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1984)
(declaring that evidence of defendant's membership in Hells Angels would not aid in
RICO conviction, thus seizure of his indicia of membership in the organization was
improper).
191 Contra Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (expressing disapproval for
the officer's asserted reason for detaining the defendant). While the officer claimed
that the defendant looked suspicious, he could point to no facts supporting this
conclusion. Id. "There is no indication in the record that it was unusual for people to
be in the alley. The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug
users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was
engaged in criminal conduct." Id.
192 Contra Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 (1979) ("Although the search
warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the
premises and to search [the bartender], it gave them no authority whatever to
invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern's
customers.").
193 The court in Perez noted that since its inception, the Candyman e-group had
approximately 6,300 members, but only 3,397 members were active at the time of
Agent Binney's investigation. United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). Under Martin's reasoning, it seems that common sense would
warrant the search of the homes and computers of former users as well as current
members, because the government need not show any current participation to
establish probable cause.
194 United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2005).
195 See NAACP. v. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 919-20 (1982) ("For liability to be
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Rather, the government should be required to offer some
evidence that specifically gives reason to believe that the
individual committed some criminal act. 196 A "'person's mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to

search . ...

'

"197

From

a policy perspective,

even

if an

organization is devoted to illicit purposes, an individual's
membership alone should not be sufficient to establish probable
cause unless the act of joining the organization implies that the
member must have committed some criminal act to become a
member, and there are some indicia of the individual's
participation.198
In the Candyman cases, if the courts defined the e-groups as
devoted to both legal and illegal activity, the government still
could have established probable cause to search those members
who joined the e-groups by sending an e-mail to the "subscribe
Those members automatically received e-mails
address."
containing child pornography.1 9 9 The government also had
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for a search of
imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group

itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to
further those illegal aims."); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961)
(Elements of membership crime "must be judged strictissimi juris, for otherwise
there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of... an
organization... might be punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally
protected purposes .... "); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) ("[A]
blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal
aims... would ... [create] a real danger that legitimate political expression or
association would be impaired .. "); United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999, 1002
(9th Cir. 1991) (affirming rule expounded in Rubio); United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d
786, 793 (9th Cir. 1984).
[W]here there is no allegation that the enterprise is wholly
illegitimate... evidence of mere association would not necessarily aid in
obtaining a conviction. Something more must be demonstrated; otherwise,
the Fourth Amendment would offer little protection for those who are
innocently associated with a legitimate enterprise, the affairs of which are
being conducted by others through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Id.
196 See United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 2005) (implying that
affidavit should have at least contained some allegations specific to defendant).
197 Id. at 156 (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91).
198 See Brown, 951 F.2d at 1003 ("[Elven if there was a widespread 'conspiracy
of corruption' in Majors 2, as the Government alleges, the information contained in
the affidavits fails to establish probable cause to believe that [the defendants] were
part of that conspiracy.").
199 United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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those members' homes who posted child pornography in the egroups, regardless of their subscription methods. But the courts
should have required the government to meet a higher burden to
establish probable cause to search the members who subscribed
via the web, and for whom the government had no additional
usage data. Specific evidence of criminal activity could have been
obtained through methods other than observing a member's email downloads. For example, some other e-group web hosts like
Yahoo might maintain logs of bandwidth usage, 200 or of the files
downloaded from an individual IP address. 20 1 Such data could
provide evidence of a member's intent to engage in the illegal
activities of the organization and create individualized suspicion.
If the courts classified the e-groups as solely devoted to illicit
activity, data regarding usage-in addition to the frequency with
which the member signed on and off the site-would be
particularly probative in determining whether the individual had
downloaded child pornography.
But to demonstrate an
individual's participation in the e-groups in the Candyman cases,
the government only offered evidence that the defendants clicked
the button to subscribe. 20 2 This minimum showing might have
been permissible had the e-groups required an individual to post
an image of child pornography before becoming a member,
because then the individual's registration in a group would
establish that he was guilty of a crime. 20 3 However, there was no
such evidence in the Candyman cases. Thus, the Coreas court
concluded: "The notion that, by this act of clicking a button, [the
defendant] provided probable cause for the police to enter his
200 Here, bandwidth usage refers to the amount of data transmitted between the
e-group and the individual's home computer. Because picture files and videos are
substantially larger in size than other web-content, an observer of bandwidth usage
could presumably tell whether an individual was downloading pictures and videos
frequently, rather than engaging in text-based chatting.
201 An IP address (Internet Protocol Address) is a unique internet identifier.
Much the same way that an individual's home is identified by a postal address, the
individual's internet connection is identified by an IP address. See Techweb: The
Business
Technology
Network,
http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/image
Friendly.jhtml?term=IP+address (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). Internet service
providers can use IP addresses to pinpoint the physical location of a computer user.
In turn, the police could use this information to obtain a search warrant of the
location with the specified IP address.
202 See Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 471. Yahoo did not track the downloads. Id.
203 The
girls12-16's welcome message stated, "you will need to post
something[,]" but did not require members to post child pornography. United States
v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2005).
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private dwelling and rummage through [his] various.., personal
effects seems utterly repellent to core purposes of the Fourth
20 4
Amendment."
V. CONCLUSION
In many instances, the Constitution protects some of the
vilest characters in our society. Protection of these individuals,
however, ensures that the Constitution guards the rights of all.
The First and Fourth Amendments embody some of the most
important protections, ensuring that individuals may freely
associate with others without worry of prosecution and that
individuals may not be subjected to search and seizure without
probable cause. If the government submits false evidence to
establish probable cause, the defendant may suppress the
evidence by showing that 1) the information was material to the
finding of probable cause, and 2) the government knowingly
submitted the false information or that it did so with a reckless
disregard for the truth.
In United States v. Martin and United States v. Coreas, two
cases that are illustrative of the Candyman cases, the Second
Circuit departed from these central teachings of First and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The government alleged that Martin
and Coreas subscribed to two online e-groups and that, upon
their subscription, like all members, they automatically received
e-mails containing child pornography. Absent this assertion,
however, the government did not allege that Martin or Coreas
specifically engaged in the illegal activities of the groups, nor did
it allege that either defendant actually participated in the egroup beyond his initial registration on the web. Based on this
information, the FBI obtained search warrants for Martin's and
204 United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2005). Although it is
unlikely to have occurred in the cases at issue, it is not difficult to imagine a case
where an individual might mistakenly click a subscribe button on another website,
perhaps in a pop-up ad, and thereby establish probable cause for the search of his
home. Of course, as the member registration process became more elaborate, for
example, by requiring the disclosure of personal information or the usage of a credit
card, the defendant's intent to join the website would be more clearly established.
Similarly, if the defendant was a member of multiple fora, it would be very unlikely
that his subscriptions were unintentional. See United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d
269, 280 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[Defendant's] use of [the email address] 'LittleLolitaLove' to
register for both the Candyman and Girls 12-16 e-groups and his failure to cancel
his memberships, further undermine any suggestion that he may have stumbl[ed]
upon the sites, never to return after discovering their content.").
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Coreas' homes and discovered child pornography. Later, it was
discovered that most members, including Martin and Coreas,
opted not to receive e-mails automatically.
It was also
established that the government had serious doubts as to
whether members automatically received e-mails before it
obtained the search warrants. Finally, the government knew
that absent the automatic e-mailing allegations, there was no
evidence that the defendants engaged in illegal activity.
Nevertheless, when the defendants appealed their convictions
and sought to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the
search warrants, the court found their causes unsympathetic.
The court concluded that probable cause existed to search the
defendants' homes based on their memberships alone, and
upheld their convictions.
Unfortunately, the implications of the majority view extend
well beyond these defendants. While the courts have convicted
some of the least sympathetic individuals here, they have also
misinterpreted the guarantees of the First and Fourth
Amendments. Thus, future defendants may be subjected to
searches based on their association alone, even when no evidence
exists that such defendants are engaged in anything more than
protected speech. Such a rule may be useful for law enforcement
when investigating members of illegal organizations, including
terrorists; however, it may be allowing the pendulum to swing
too far.
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